This
article is based on a paper presented at the Asian Studies on the Pacific Coast
annual meeting in Vancouver, British Columbia, June 14-i6, 1973.
INDONESIA,
like other Asian Third World States, has been confronted with many new problems
arising from the rapidly changing policies of, and relations between the major
powers.These shifts, essentially representing a transformation of the
international system, began in i969 and have accelerated since i971. They began
with the receding of China's Cultural Revolution in i968-69 (marked by the
Chinese Communist Party's Ninth Congress in April i969) and a return to a more
active and moderate foreign policy on Peking's part. The border clashes of i969
brought Sino-Soviet relations to a new nadir and soon led to intensified
competition in Southeast Asia and elsewhere between these two powers. During
the same period, the role of the United States in Asia was being drastically
revised: both the gradual de-escalation in Vietnam and the announcement of the
Nixon Doctrine seemed to indicate a significantly lowered American posture in
the area. In perhaps the most far-reaching of all the changes, there emerged a
rapprochement between the U. S. and China, dramatically altering a twenty-year
hostile relationship. Along with this came a substantial warming-especially in
the areas of strategic arms limitations and trade-in U. S.-Soviet relations as
well. Finally, predating the period under consideration but accelerating during
it, was the fact of Japan's increasing role as an aspiring regional (if not
global) power.
This
article examines how and how far Indonesia has responded to these changes. Like
other "lesser powers," Indonesia has had to assess the meaning of
these complex and still ongoing realignments for the protection and advancement
of its own interests. This is not to say that Indonesian foreign policy has
simply reacted to external variables; indeed, a major theme of the article is
that the alterations in Indonesia's foreign policy as a response to these
changes have been within the framework of domestic, political and economic
forces, and that the internal issues have had primacy. Moreover, such
alterations as have occurred have been carried out in a most
"Javanese" manner, with extreme caution, indirection, and subtlety. One
is struck by the analogy between the contemporary foreign policy process in
Djakarta and the Javanese wajang, or shadow play: from the "shadow
side," where foreigners sit, one is certain there is more going on than he
can see but cannot be sure just what it is.
Given
this framework and "atmosphere," as well as the lack of openness of
the process, then, merely discerning the changes is difficult enough: tracing
the links between cause and effect is even more so. Nevertheless, the pieces of
evidence can be put together to provide an analysis of develop- ments in
Indonesia's foreign policy since i969. After an examination of the broad
outlines Indonesian foreign policy before and immediately after the coup of
October i, i965 the new debates and directional changes since i969 and
especially I97i are analyzed, with special attention to the recent period
(through April I973) of foreign policy discussion. The aim is to gauge the
"mood" and ascertain the nature of the debate in Djakarta's
decision-making and opinion-forming circles. Some of the analysis of current
trends and the concluding glance at probable future developments is necessarily
speculative.
The
events of the October i965 coup and its aftermath of the next several months
mark a great divide in contemporary Indonesian history. Foreign policy as well
as internal politics underwent a radical revision. As the two most powerful
supporters of Djakarta's "axis" with Peking, President Sukarno and
the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), were rendered powerless (the latter
bloodily and the former in a more indirect and gradual manner), China emerged
clearly as the chief foreign "loser." The increas- ingly close
relations of the first half of the i960's were reversed and by late 1967, when
diplomatic relations were "frozen," mutual hostility was intense.
There was no improvement up to i969.
For
the Soviet Union the coup and its aftermath had a mixed impact on its relations
with Indonesia.' Having seen itself displaced by the CPR as Sukarno's closest
"comrade-in-arms" in the early ig6os (despite assiduous and expensive
Soviet diplomatic, economic and military efforts), Moscow was naturally
relieved to see China's fall from influence. It accordingly attempted to foster
closer relations with the emerging mili- tary regime, while trying also to slow
down anti-Communist policies internally and pro-Western leanings externally.
Nevertheless, the new regime under General Suharto seemed less than anxious to
rebuild Soviet-Indonesian relations. During i968 the Kremlin apparently decided
that this "compromise" policy was doing nothing to stop the
increasingly strong pro-Western orientation of Indonesia's foreign policy nor
its sup- pression of Communism internally. In the hope of the revival of a
Moscow influenced PKI, the Soviet Union consequently adopted a harsher, anti-
Suharto stance and the correct but cool relations between Moscow and Djakarta
grew increasingly strained and unfriendly into i969.
It
was the United States and Japan that gained most in terms of closer relations
with Indonesia following the i965 coup. These countries, particu- larly the U.
S., had been targets of Sukarno's abuse as the reactionary and doomed "Old
Established Forces," and the American "presence" in Indonesia
had been drastically reduced from its peak in the mid-i950s. Nevertheless, it
was to the U. S., Japan, and other Western states that Indonesia turned in the i966-I$9
period. The motivations for this included an effort to restore some semblance
of independence and non-alignment to Indonesia's foreign policy as well as the
desire for defense against the dangers of Communist subversion (internal but
supported from the out- side). Undoubtedly the most significant incentive for
this undertaking, however, was the new regime's goal of economic recovery and
development. In an effort to build confidence among Western creditors and
potential donors of fresh assistance, the Suharto government rejoined the
United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, ended its
"confrontation" with Malaysia, and announced that it would return all
foreign enterprises confiscated during that adventure, accepted an IMF
stabilization program, and drew up what aimed to be a balanced budget. With
relatively little hesitation, the U. S., several European countries and Japan
first agreed to a postponement of the repayment of the long-standing and
substantial debts incurred by Sukarno's "Old Order." This group,
referred to as the "Tokyo Club"2 and later more formally constituted
as the Inter-Govern- mental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), then moved to provide
the massive economic assistance which Djakarta sought to rehabilitate and
develop its devastated economy. IGGI (with the U. S. and Japan supplying
approxi- mately one-third each) granted $200 million to Indonesia for i967,
$360 million for i968, and $500 million for i969. This, combined with warmly-
encouraged private foreign investment, meant that 8i per cent of the first year
of Indonesia's first Five Year Plan was to come from foreign sources. Not
surprisingly, relations between Indonesia and the U. S. and to a lesser extent
between Indonesia and Japan and Western European countries improved
considerably thereafter. .......
